Israeli National Security Policy for Dummies
Why winning only on the battlefield is not enough anymore.
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I want to dust off some excerpts from an academic paper I wrote at Reichman University in 2014 on Israeli National Security to see if it still holds up today. Is it time to reexamine our security policies that have helped us survive for nearly a century or have we strayed too far from them and need to return to the basics?
Without further ado, here are my musings on Israeli national security from 10 years ago. I’ll put the excerpts from the original paper in italics and bold and comment as we go (🔷) as needed if my views have changed.
Israeli national security decision-making process is mainly defined by Israel’s culture. The persistent threat of aggression toward Israel has preoccupied politicians with a “thundering present” that has condemned legislators to rely on ad hoc solutions (Freilich, 2006, pg. 9). Due to intense volatility in the Middle East, politicians have come to accept their inability to influence foreign relations and instead have adopted a “wait and see” approach and overreliance on improvisation, or ‘iltur’ in Hebrew. In a politically polarized society like Israel, iltur “enables action without requiring clear articulation of objectives… and facilitates flexibility during times of crisis” (Freilich, 2006, pg. 10). Correspondingly, the informal decision-making process and aversion to long term planning has become institutionalized to keep political orientation intentionally obscure to win elections and maintain coalitions.
Furthermore, Israel has no doctrinal publications on security affairs, such as Presidential Policy Directives or White Papers to formulate an overarching strategy (Freilich, 2006). The lack of formal strategy at times poses serious risks for Israeli national security. When the prime minister and cabinet are dysfunctional, Israel has no means of generating effective decisions on a national level because no effective policymaking forum exists (Rodman, 2003). In the absence of clearly stated national directives, there is often confusion, ineffective policy implementation and lack of accountability, as demonstrated during the Gaza Disengagement in 2005.
🔷So far this is more or less tracking. We still suck at communicating our overarching vision and strategically planning long term. I believe it’s because Israel’s system of governance relies on coalitions that are easily disrupted, which makes long term planning difficult. We very desperately need something like Saudi Arabia’s 2030 plan for Israel, for the year 2050 or even 2100. Stay tuned for a future crack at that.
Jewish history has equally informed the development of Israeli national security. Israeli citizens, the majority of whom are Jewish, suffer from a “societal sense of insecurity” wrought by centuries of enslavement and systematic annihilation in the Diaspora that facilitates a psychosis known as the siege mentality (Adamsky, 2010, pp. 115). This complex, characterized by the conviction that Israel faces an inevitable existential threat, propagates an “obsession with survival” that lies at the heart of Israeli strategic planning and rationalizes Israel’s relentless quest for absolute security, often at the expense of other worthy endeavors (Kobi, 2009).
🔷This sounds nice, but now that we’ve all seen when the world says Never Again, they don’t really mean it, I actually think our collective “psychosis” is justified. I am not sure what other endeavors are worth pursuing if we’re dead because we failed to establish security and deterrence with the people trying to kill us. Maybe I’ve become too cynical, but there are no initiatives that rank higher then security for me, at least right now as I try to think of what they could be.
Absolute security is difficult, if not impossible, to attain given Israel’s lack of strategic depth and a host of other asymmetries, including unfavorable population demographics, a small economy and low tolerance for causalities when compared to hostile neighboring nations. In 1955, Ben Gurion wrote, “we can never assume that we can deliver one final blow to the enemy that will be the last battle… the situation for our enemies is the opposite” (Handel, 1996, pg. 537). Therefore, Israelis believe they are doomed to engage in indefinite rounds of violence.
This realization, along with Israel’s economic and territorial considerations, is paramount to the development of the main Israeli security concept, the security triangle. The three pillars of the security triangle include deterrence, intelligence warning, and battlefield decision. The security triangle begins with deterrence, threats of force intended to dissuade enemies from attacking. Deterrence can be achieved in two ways, by denial or punishment (Henriksen, 2012). Deterrence by denial attempts to negate the benefits of enemy attacks by building up defensive measures, for example distributing gas masks to diminish the harm of a biological attack. Conversely, deterrence by punishment is an offensive measure, generally following an attack, which signifies deterrence has already failed.
🔷I think we can all agree deterrence by denial failed on October 7th, but I would be more careful today to make clear that deterrence by punishment does not mean collective punishment for Palestinians, but instead means punishment against Hamas by degrading their military and political apparatuses. I think even most Israelis would agree, having lived through wars and intifadas in the past, that we grossly underestimated the length Hamas and similar terror groups would go to to purposely endanger the lives of their own people to score political points. Deterring an enemy like this is not an easy task and is discussing how is worthy of more exploration.
When deterrence collapses, the next phase in the security triangle is to provide an early warning. Strangely, it is the responsibility of AMAN, a military intelligence unit in the IDF, to provide this warning to give the army more time to mobilize reserve forces and launch preventative strikes (Bar-Joseph, 2010). This is unique because in most countries the State Department is responsible for this task and not the military. However, when Israel was founded there were no formal diplomatic ties with neighboring countries so the State Department was not given a great deal of responsibility and the military became much more powerful than other government agencies, occasionally to its own detriment. Although AMAN accurately forecasted the Six Day War and provided an early warning in time, during the Yom Kippur War the threat assessment was mismanaged due to false assumptions that ended up costing many lives (Bar-Joseph, 2006).
🔷Again, we know now that there were reports and intelligence signals that predicted the October 7th attack, but we made false assumptions about Hamas’ true intentions that led to us to send too many military brigades from Gaza into West Bank. It’s hard to shit on politicians for misinterpreting these intelligence reports, because we do not see all the false signals that they correctly interpret. Israel unfortunately cannot mobilize the reserves for every credible threat, or they would be constantly mobilized. This is a horrible reality that is well known to our enemies and exploited frequently.
The last corner of the security triangle concerns battlefield decisions. “A state of decision is recognized as such when the enemy loses its ability to act effectively” (Bar-Joseph, 2005, pg. 141). A definitive battlefield decision also helps rebuild deterrence and delay the next round of violence. Conclusive battlefield decisions are increasingly difficult to realize today, even when they are militarily feasible, because superpowers intervene beforehand to maintain stability by imposing ceasefires on the warring nations (Bar Joseph, 2005).
🔷Yes, still true. It remains to be seen if Israelis are tired enough of the status quo of endless rounds of violence that they are willing to flip over the table and definitively destroy Hamas in Rafah as I write this. I sincerely hope they will.
Moreover, a lack of strategic depth and a small economy restrict Israeli options on the battlefield. To counteract these constraints, Israel attempts to transfer warfare immediately into enemy territory and to end the fighting quickly. Israel’s enemies on the other hand, attempt to wage long wars of attrition to their advantage. To thwart this potentially effective tactic, Israel embraces a culture of offensively minded military tacticians dubbed the cult of the offensive. Politicians and military leaders subscribe to the offensive dogma because they are keenly aware of Israel’s territorial vulnerabilities and finite resources. Consequently, preemptive strikes that feature superior armor and air force brigades are almost always a strategic precondition (Naveh, 1996, pg. 173). In the aftermath of the Gulf War, with the arrival of ballistic missile threats to the Israeli homeland, the military was forced to include defensive strategies in their offensive tactics to protect citizens.
Although Israel has developed into one of the strongest and most modern military organizations in the world, its strength is dependent on foreign aid (Handel, 1996, pg. 549). Therefore, Israel is always extremely careful to operate under the umbrella of a superpower and to avoid direct conflict with them at all costs. Failure to adhere to this policy can have potentially disastrous results. For example, during the War of Attrition against Egypt, the Soviet Union sent over ten thousand soldiers to operate sophisticated anti-aircraft batteries, completely neutralizing Israel’s air superiority (Megan, 2009). To further bolster her defense, Israel also attempts to form peripheral alliances with other countries in the Middle East that have mutual enemies, for example with Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia (Adamsky, 2010).
🔷This is the tightrope we must walk today. Fortunately, we’ve enjoyed a special relationship with America, but there may come a day where Israel must explore alliances with other superpowers or cultivate ways to be militarily and economically independent (which will be difficult in the short term given the military threats relative to her economy). It’s worth exploring whether these assumptions are still true today, and if so, how we can break free from these shackles over the next 100 years.
Due to historical reflections, Israel approaches alliances with skepticism. Accordingly, Israel has always attempted to maintain independent weapons manufacturing and a quantitative military edge (QME) by ensuring their technology and the quality of their officers and soldiers is always a step ahead of rivals (Adamsky, 2010, pg. 113). This advantage has been gradually eroded by arms sales from superpowers to potential foes, like Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. To preserve the QME, Israel pioneers the latest developments in radical military innovations (RMAs), developments that change the nature of warfare.
Presently, RMAs are emerging in the field of information technology. In 1982 in the Bekaa Valley, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) destroyed nineteen SAM batteries and shot down more than twenty MIGS without losing a single airplane (Adamsky, 2010, pg. 95). This battle illustrated the militaries, “improved arms coordination, capabilities for dissemination of target intelligence, command and control and precision fire,” verifying their ability to terminate most observable threats. Unfortunately, due to Israel’s reverence for the cult of the offensive and the inability of the general staff (GS) and strategic planning department to dedicate sufficient time and resources to analyzing the efficacy of Israel’s grand strategy, this military innovation was not implemented, except on a limited tactical basis, for decades.
🔷Hopefully we are keeping up here with RMAs- the efficacy of the Iron Dome against Iran’s attack was one modern example of the sophistication of Israeli technology. This is an area that needs constant focus. Israel is a tiny country and we’ll always have to rely on technological innovations to bridge the gap for our military.
Now that there is an understanding of Israel’s strategic culture, historical motivations and the rationale behind the security concept, it is imperative to examine imminent threats. While Israel was busy solidifying its RMA advantages, Israel’s enemies responded by investing in their own military revolution that Israel refers to as stress survivability. These include building bunkers and tunnels, low signature forces like guerilla fighters and suicide bombers, development and attainment of trajectory ballistic weapons (SSMs and SSRs) that are cheap and simple to operate, and media and propaganda efforts to undermine the internal and international legitimacy of Israel (Brun and Valenci, 2012, pg. 17). Although these innovations appear crude and inexpensive, they are still extremely hazardous to Israeli national security and must be addressed seriously.
🔷This is pretty accurate. I failed to predict to the rise of drone warfare, but I wouldn’t change much else if I wrote it today.
Adding a fourth defensive pillar to the security triangle is one potential solution to address the probability of future rocket and missile threats against Israeli population centers that cannot be nullified offensively (Rubin, 2009) Defensive measures, such as building protective fortifications like walls and fences and the proliferation of anti-ballistic missile systems like the Iron Dome are essential to protecting Israel’s citizens and infrastructure, especially ports and chemical manufacturers (Rubin, 2009). Regrettably, the security situation concerning the effective media campaigns being waged against Israel internationally is far more precarious and poses an even larger danger to Israel then rockets surrounding the nation. Increased sensitivity to collateral damage and the immediate dissemination of factual information to counteract propaganda will be crucial. Despite the many challenges Israel faces I’m confident we will overcome these threats and prosper.
🔷Well, this one was written 10 years ago and it was clear then we were losing the PR war then just as we’re losing it now. Social media has only grown exponentially since this was written, which was predictable, so it’s sad in the intervening years we’ve not come up with an effective strategy yet on messaging. Does social media inherently breed misinformation or does Jew hatred breed misinformation? This is the antisemitic chicken and egg dilemma of our time. Figuring this out is our greatest challenge and likely our greatest opportunity.
All in all, I think this paper held up pretty well. Now that we can see the dilemmas we faced a decade ago are still the same obstacles we need to surmount, let’s get to work.
Stay classy Maccabee Nation.
Sources
Adamsky, D. (2010). “The Culture of Military Innovation.” Stanford University Publishing, pp.110-111, 115-125.
Bar-Joseph, U. (2005). “The Paradox of Israeli Power.” Survival, vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 137-156.
Bar-Joseph, U. (2010). “Military Intelligence as the National Intelligence Estimator and the Case of Israel.” Armed Forces and Society, vol. 36. No. 3, pp. 505-525.
Bar-Joseph, U. (2006). “The Watchmen Fall Asleep.” SUNI Publishing, New York.
Brun, I, and Valenci C. (2012). “The RMA of the Other Side.” Contemporary Military Innovation Journal, London, Routledge, pp. 107-130.
Freilich, C. (2006). “National Security Decision Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies and Strengths.” Middle East Journal, vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 635-663.
Handel, M. (1996). “The Evolution of Israeli Strategy: The Psychology of Insecurity and the Quest for Absolute Security.” Cambridge University Publishing, pp. 534-579.
Henriksen, D. (2012). “Deterrence by Default? Israel’s Military Strategy in 2006 war against Hizballah.” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 95-120.
Kober, A. (2003). “The Intellectual and Modern Focus in Israeli Military Thinking as Reflected in Ma’arachot articles 1948-2000.” Armed Forces and Society Journal, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 141-160.
Kobi, M. (2009). “Who Really Dictates What an Existential Threat Is? The Israeli Experience.” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 32, no. 5, pp. 687-713.
Magen, Z. (2009). “Israel and Russian Foreign Policy.” INSS Insight, no. 132.
Naveh, S. (1996). “The Cult of Offensive Preemption and Future Challenges for Israeli Operational Thought.” Between War and Peace: Dilemmas of Israeli Security pp.168-188.
Rodman, D. (2003). “Israel’s National Security Doctrine: An Appraisal of the Past and a Vision of the Future.” Israel Affairs, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 115-140.
Rubin, U. (2009). “An Active Defense Against Rockets and Missiles.” Bar Ilan University, BESA Perspective Paper, mo. 69, pp. 1-5.
Thanks for joining me on this trip down memory lane. Credit also to my wife, who edited this original paper when were dating at the time and edited this article 10 years later. For over a decade she has been removing curse words, and hateful comments about Bernie Sanders that fall into a legal gray area (sometimes both in the same sentence) because she is an excellent writer.
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